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The matter of construction of terms was not by any means the
only obstacle facing insurers in the effective use of specific clauses
as excluding from coverage risks connected with aeronautical flight.
In practically every state the inclusion of a clause in all policies
making such contract incontestable after the expiration of an arbi-
trary period, usually one or two years from the date coverage began
thereunder, 17 3 was required by statute, 7 ' resulting immediately upon
the adoption of these aeronautical clauses in the rather doubtful
query as to whether or not such exclusion was not in fact a limita-
tion upon the force and effect of such incontestable clause and a
* Continued from the July issue, 7 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 305 (1936).
t Graduate student, Northwestern University School of Law, 1935-36.
173. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 260 F. 593, 171 C. C. A.
357 (1919) ; New York Life Ins. Co. v. McCarthy, 22 F. (2d) 241 (C. C. A.
1927) ; Schwartz v. Northern Life Ins. Co., 25 F. (2d) 555 (1928), cert. denied,
278 U. S. 628, 49 S. Ct. 29, 73 L. Ed. 547 (1928).
174. A typical statute follows: "No policy of life insurance shall be
issued in this state or be issued by a life insurance company organized under
the laws of this state unless the same shall contain the following provisions:(3) A provision that the policy shall constitute the entire contract be-
tween the parties and shall be incontestable after two years from its date,
except for non-payment of premiums and except for violations of the conditions
of the policy relating to military or naval services in time of war."
See: Ala. Code Ann. (1928) §8365; lRev. Code Ariz. (Struckmeyer 1928)
§1847 (3); Gen. Laws Cal. (1932) c. 145, §10206 (group insurance) ; Comp.
Laws Col, (1932) §2516(2), §2595 (b) (group insurance); Laws Del. (1921)
§606(3); Dist. Col. Pub. Act. 436, c. 5, §3(3) (73 Cong. 1934); Idaho Code
Ann. (1932) §40-1303(2); Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 73, §261(3);
Ind. Stat. (Burns, 1933) §39-801(3) (double indemnity may be-excepted if
desired); Code Iowa (1935) c. 399-El, §8684-e5(1) (group insurance); Rev.
Stat. Kans. (1933) §40-420(2) (disability and accidental death benefits may be
excepted at the option of insurer) ; Rev. Stat. Maine (1930) c. 60, §147 (total
and permanent disability may also be excepted at option of insurer) ; Ann. Laws
Mass. (1932) c. 175, §132(2) (total and permanent disability may also be ex-
cepted at option of insurer) ; Comp. Laws Mich. (1929) §12427 (double indem-
nity and disability provisions may be excepted also at option of company);
Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927) c. 74, §3426 (double indemnity and disability pro-
visions may also be excepted at option of insurer); Comp. Stat. Neb. (1929)
§44-602(5) ; Cons. Laws N. Y. (Cahill, 1930) c. 30, §101 (disability and double
indemnity may also be excepted at option of insurer) ; N. C. Code (1935)
§6466(b) (group insurance); Comp. Laws nf N. D. (1913) §6635(c); N. M.
Stat. (1929) §71-161(3) (aviation a part of statutory exceptions); Ohio Ann.
Code (Throckmorton, 1934) §9411; Okla. Stat. (1931) §10524(3); Oregon Code
Ann. (1930) §46-506: Penn. Stat. (Purdon. 1930) §40-510(c) ; Tenn. Code Ann.
( Vlliams, 1934) §6179(3) ; Rev. Stat. Utah (1933) §43-3-24(3) : Rev. Civ. Stat.
Tex. (1925) §4732(4) ; Va. Code Ann. (1930) §4228; Rev. Stat. Wash. (Reming-
ton, 1932) §7230(2) Wyom. Rev. Stat. (1931) §57-232(3).
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"contest" of the policy within the meaning of such clause. Prior
judicial decision upon analogous attempted limitations of risk gave
ample room for conjecture as to such a probability.7 5  Of similar
degree of importance were the rather common statutes prohibiting
the inclusion in a policy of any provisions for mode of settlement
at maturity of less value than the amount insured by the policy,
plus dividend additions, if any, less any indebtedness to the com-
pany on the policy and less any premium that might by the terms
of the policy be deducted.1 7 6
Incontestable Clause:
Conflicting Views-"The object of the clause is plain and
laudable-to create :an absolute assurance of the benefit, as free as
may be from any dispute of fact except the fact of death."
Thus spoke 'the United States Supreme Court through Justice
Holmes in determining the effect of an incontestable clause upon a
provision declaring the policy void in case of suicide of the insured,
contained in the contract involved in the famous Northwestern
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson decision. 177
Consistent with this view promulgated by the nation's highest
tribunal, an imposing array of state and federal courts have con-
strued such clause as meaning that by agreement of the parties, the
cause of death has ceased to be an issue of fact, and that the at-
175. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 254 U. S. 96, 41 Sup.
Ct. 47, 55 A. L. R. 549 (1920) (suicide) affirming Northwestern Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Johnson, Nat. Life Ins. Co. of Montpeiier, Vt. V. Miller, 275 F. 757
(C. C. A. 6th, 1921) ; Philadelphia Life Ins. Co. v. Burgess, et al., 18 F (2d)
599 (D. C. S. C., 1927) (suicide) ; Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Robbs, 177 Ark. 275,
6 S. W. (2d) 520 (1928) (suicide) ; Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Lovejoy,
201 Ala. 337. 78 So. 299 (1917) (suicide) ; Mass. Benefit Life Ass'n v. Robinson,
104 Ga. 256, 30 S. E. 918, 42 L. R. A. 274 (1898) (misrepresentations as to
habits) ; Royal Circle V. Achterrath, 204 Ill. 549, 68 N. E. 492 (1903) (suicide)-,
Goodwin v. Prov. Say. Life Assurance Ass'n of N. Y., 97 Iowa 226, 66 N. W. 157
(1896) (death by own hands) ; Supreme Court of Honor v. Updegraff, 68 Kan.
474, 75 Pac. 477 (1904) (suicide) ; Mareck v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Assn,
62 Minn. 39, 64 N. W. 68, 58 Am. St. Rep. 613 (1895) (death at own hands) ;
Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Payne, 32 S. W. 1063 (Tex., 1895) (death by
own hands). See also 31 A. L. R. 103.
176. Typical of such statutes is the following: "No policy of insurance
shall be issued or delivered in this state if it contains any of the following
provisions: . . . (4) A provision for any mode of settlement at maturity of
less value than the amount insured by the policy plus dividend additions, if any,
less any indebtedness to the company on the policy and less any premium that
may by the terms of the policy be deducted, payments to be made in accordance
with the terms of the policy." Indiana Statutes (Burns, 1933) §39-802(3).
See also Idaho Code Ann. (1932) §40-1304; Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1935)
c. 73, §262; Rev. Stat. Kan. (1933) §40-421; Comp. Laws Mich. (1929) §12295;
Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927) c. 74 §3406; Comp. Stat. Neb. (1929) §44-603; Comp.
Laws N. D. (1913) §6635(d) (4) : Ohio Ann. Code (Throckmorton, 1934)
§9421(5) ; Okla. Stat. (1931) §10525(3) ; Penn. Stat. (Purdon, 1930) §40-
511(d) ; Tenn. Code Ann. (Williams, 1934) §6180(4) ; Rev. Stat. Tex. (1925)
§4733(3) ; Wyom. Rev. Stat. (1931) §57-233.
177. 254 U. S. 96. 41 Sup. Ct. 47; see also 55 A. L. R. 549 (1920).
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tempt to escape liability on the part of the insurer by asserting death
from any cause other than those specified within the incontestable
clause itself was a contest of the policy and therefore in direct con-
flict with such clause.'78
In arriving at such determination, four judicial principles
evolve as the grounds most consistently used by the courts: (1)
that by inclusion of the incontestable clause the insurer proffers to
the insured that if he pays the premiums on a policy that not only
will the contract be incontestable, but the right to recover the death
benefit shall be likewise incontestable; (2) expressio unius est
exclusio alteriuS17 -by making express exceptions within the in-
contestable clause itself, there can be no further exceptions; (3)
the time limit set within the terms of the incontestable clause shall
govern the entire contract-and the validity of any clause providing
that such contract does not cover death from a specified cause ends
with the expiration of such time limit; (4) ambiguity in any in-
surance policy must be resolved against the insurer.8 0
Various courts, however, began to slowly break away from the
preponderance of cases ruling that the incontestable clause was all-
controlling in life policies,""' and in distinguishing between express
risk exclusions and forfeitures and conditions, ruled that a pro-
vision for incontestability does not have the effect of converting a
provision to pay on the happening of a stated contingency into a
promise to pay whether such contingency does or does not happen.1 8 2
A party to the instrument could not, according to these decisions,
178. Note 175. Typical of the view adopted by these courts is the follow-
ing: "Construing this contract as a whole, it seems that if the insured died
within two years of its date, the insurance company may contest the cause of
death, or may set up fraud, or misrepresentation in the procurement of the
Insurance, or any other matter that would be a defense to the action on the
policy; but if he does not die within two years from issuance of policy, and he
pays all the premiums agreed to be paid, then the insurance company will not
contest, or refuse the payment of the amount agreed to be paid on any ground
whatever . . . The company agreed that it would not litigate any of these
questions, though without the incontestable clause they would be a defense."(Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Lovejoy, note 175.)
179. For numerous citations, recognizing, explaining, and adopting this
legal maxim, see 25 C. J. 220.
180. Note 43.
181. Note 175.
182. Sanders v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 10 F. (2d) 143 (C. C. A.
5th, 1925) (insured murdered) ; Hearin v. Standa'd Life Ins. Co., 8 F. (2d) 202(D. C. E. D. Ark., 1925) (suicide) : Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Mack, 12 F.(2d) 416 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926), cert. denied, 271 U. S. 687 (suicide) ; Flannagan
V. Provident Life & Ace. Ins. Co. et at, 22 F. (2d) 136 (C. C. A. 4th. 1927)
(injured while intoxicated) ; Wright v. Phitadelphia Life Ins. Co., 25 F. (2d)
514 (D. C. S. C., 1927) (suicide) ; Collins V. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 133
l11. App. 326 (1907) (reversed on other grounds, 232 Ill. 37, 83 N. E. 542)(execution for crime) ; Myers v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 124 Kan. 191, 257 P. 933(1927) (suicide); Stean V. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 24 N. M. 346, 171 P. 786
(1918) (suicide); Scarborough v. American Nat. Ins. Co., 171 N, C. 353, 88
AERONAUTIC RISK EXCLUSION
be said to be contesting the policy by raising the question as to
whether under the terms a liability asserted by another party had or
had not accrued.
Particularly outstanding in this development were the cases in-
volving suicide clauses, 1 3 which ordinarily provided that suicide
was a risk not assumed, and that in event of suicide, the policy was
void, or the company would return the premiums with interest, the
cash surrender value, or some other amount. Pertinent also were
the decisions to the effect that the insurer was not contesting the
policy by denying coverage where the insured was executed for
violation of law,' and a Federal court decision'8 5 that the insurer
did not contest the policy by relying on a stipulation that the policy
did not cover death of the insured if he was killed "while under
the influence of narcotics . . . or while violating the law." This
view was further supported by two decisions to the effect that it
was not contesting a policy to rely on a clause excluding death from
injuries intentionally inflicted by another,' 8 while a New York
court concluded that it was not a contest of a policy to insist on a
provision that, if the insured misstated his age, the amount of
insurance should be adjusted to what the premiums would have
purchased at the insured's correct age.187
The exclusion of specific risks from the double indemnity pro-
S. E. 482, L. R. A. 1918A. 896. Ann. Cas. 1917D, 1181 (1916) (execution for
crime) ; Jolley v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 199 N. C. 269. 154 S. E. 400(1930) (intentionally shot); Sipp v. Philadelphia Life Ins. Co., 293 Pa. 292,
132 A. 221 (1928) (age misrepresentation); Childress v. Fraternal Union, 113
Tenn. 252, 82 S. W. 832, 3 Ann. Cas. 236 (1904) (suicide) Scales v. JeffersonStandard Life Ins. Co., 155 Tenn. 412, 295 S. W. 58 (1927) (suicide) ; Wood-bery v. New York Life Ins. Co., 129 Misc. Rep. 365, 221 N. Y. S. 357 (1927) (sul-
cide) ; Murphy v. Travelers Ins. Co., 134 Misc. Rep. 238, 234 N. Y. S. 278 (1928)(age misrepresentation) Howard v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 289 S. W. 114(Texas, 1927) (suicide) United Security Life Ins. Co. v. Massey, et al, 164S. E. 529 (Va., 1932) (change of employment). See Vance, Insurance, op. cit.,
p. 821, §231.
183. Full citation of the following cases appears in note 182. Hearin V.Standard Life Ins. Co.; Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Mack; Wright v. Philadelphia
Life Ins. Co.; Myers v. Liberty Life Ins. Co.; Stean v. Occidental Life Ins. Co.,*
Childress v. Fraternal Union; Scales v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co.; Wood-bery v. New York Life Ins. Co.; Howard v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co.
184. Collins V. Met. Life Ins. Co., 133 Ill. App. 326 (1907) (reversed on
other grounds, 232 111. 37. 83 N. E. 542); Scarborough v. American Nationa?Life Ins. Co., 171 N. E. 353, 88 S. E. 482, L. R. A. 1918A 896, Ann. Cas. 1917D,
1181.
185. Flannagan v. Pray. Life A Acc. Ins. Co., 22 F. (2d) 136 (C. C. A.
4th, 1927).
186. Sanders v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., note 182; Jolley v. Jef-ferson Standard Life Ins. Co., note 182; "By the use of tl e term 'incontestable'
the parties must necessarily mean that the provisions of the policy shall not be
contested, and not that the insurance company agrees to waive the right todefend itself against a risk which it never contracted to assume. That is to
say, the application of the incontestable clause precludes an insurance com-pany from questioning the validity of the contract in its inception, or that it
thereafter became invalid by reason of a broken condition. Hence, an ordinary
incontestable clause, cannot be used as a means of rewriting into the contract
risks and hazards which the policy itself positively excluded."
187. Murphy v. Travelers Ins. Co., 134 Misc. Rep. 238, 234 N. Y. S. 278(1928).
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vision for accidental death issued with a large percentage of life
policies, necessarily emphasized the query as to whether or not the
incontestable clause contained in the policy extended to and covered
such double indemnity provision. For some years the question
remained in doubt, though the courts of two jurisdictions have
since decided in the affirmative,""8 and three additional consistent
decisions' 89 go to great lengths in determining whether or not
certain risk exclusions in the double indemnity provision were
voided by the terms of the particular incontestable clause, thus
holding by the strongest implication that such addition is within
the scope of such incontestability provision unless the contrary is
specifically stated within the wording of the clause itself.
Conway Rule as to Aviation Riders-It remained, however,
for the New York Court of Appeals, speaking through Chief Jus-
tice Cardozo in the 1930 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Conway,
Supt. of Insurance'0 case to judicially establish the validity of avia-
tion exclusion riders in the case of policies containing statutory in-
contestable clauses not in themselves listing aviation as an exception
from the force and effect of such clause, by distinguishing between
assumption and non-assumption of risk. The litigation arose on
the refusal of the New York Superintendent of Insurance to per-
mit the use of the following rider for life policies because of its
alleged conflict with the state statutory incontestable clause,'9'
which made the policy incontestable after it had been in force for
two years, except for non-payment of premiums and for violation
of the conditions of the policy relating to military or naval service
in time of war:
"Death as a result of service, travel or flight in any species of aircraft,
except as a fare-paying passenger, is a risk not assumed under this policy; but
if the insured shall die as a result, directly or indirectly, of such service, travel
or flight, the company will pay to the beneficiary the reserve on this policy."
In distinguishing between the case before him and the land-
mark Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson decision8 2 to
the effect that the object of the incontestable clause is to create an
absolute assurance of benefit free from any dispute of death, Justice
Cardozo classified the exception clause in the Johnson case as a
188. Ftshel v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 151 Misc. Rep. 153, 270 N. Y.
S. 734 (1933) ; Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. Rimmer, 157 Tenn. 597,
12 S. W. (2d) 365 (1928).
189. Ness v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 70 F. (2d) 59 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934):
Sanders V. Jefferson Stan. Life Ins. Co., note 182; Jolley v. Jefferson Standard
Life Ins. Co., note 182.
190. 252 N. Y. 449, 169 N. E. 642 (1930).
191. Consolidated Laws (New York, 1909) c. 28, §101.
192. Note 177.
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forfeiture provision in contradistinction to a limitation as to cover-
age, and held that therefore the incontestable clause therein involved,
coupled with the payment of premiums, would sustain a recovery
in the face of any forfeiting condition. It was quite another thing,
however, according to Cardozo, to say that the same facts would
prevail against a refusal to assume the risk.
After disposing of. the alleged binding effect of the Johnson
case, the New York court concluded to the effect that the provision
stating a policy to be incontestable after it had been in force during
the lifetime of the insured for a period of two years is not a man-
date as to coverage nor a definition of the hazards to be borne by
the insurer, but means instead only that within the limits of the
coverage the policy shall stand, unaffected by any defense that it
was invalid in its inception or thereafter became invalid by reason
of a condition broken. A provision for incontestability was de-
scribed as not having the effect of converting a promise to pay on
the happening of a stated contingency into a promise to pay whether
such contingency does or does not happen, as where there has been
no assumption of risk there can be no liability.
Construction as to Aviation Riders Subsequent to Conway
Decision-This distinction between limitation on the coverage
and limitation on a defense of invalidity, resulting in approval of
the efficacy of aviation risk exclusion clauses even in policies con-
taining statutory incontestable clauses not in themselves excepting
such risk, was given unequivocal approval by the Circuit Court of
Appeals of the Tenth Circuit in the case of Head v. New York
Life Ins. Co. 193 just a few months subsequent to its first promulga-
tion by the New York court.
Though only two state courts"' have had occasion since the
Conway case in 1930 to pass upon the point therein involved, di-
rectly contra results have been reached by these two tribunals. The
Washington court, when faced in 1933 in the case of Pacific Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Fishback195 with precisely the identical situation
involved in the Conway case,9'9 adopted without reservation the
193. 43 F. (2d) 517 (C. C. A. 10th, 1930). (Insured was killed in an air-
plane accident subsequent to the expiration of the contestable period. Suit
was brought on the double indemnity clause of the policy. Insurer relied on
the aeronautic risk exception clause, while the insured's beneficiary relied on
the incontestable clause.)
194. Louisiana and Washington.
195. 171 Wash. 244, 17 P. (2d) 841 (1933).
196. The Washington statutory clause (Remington's Comp. Stat. (1932)§§7229, 9230) excepted only non-payment of premiums and violation of policy
conditions relating to military or naval service in time of war from the force
and effect of such clause. The proposed aviation clause which was rejected by
the insurance commissioner, Fishback, in this case follows: "Except as herein
below provided, death resulting directly or indirectly, In whole or in part, from
being In or on any vehicle or mechanical device for aerial navigation, or from
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latter decision both as to reasoning and result. The Supreme Court
of Louisiana, however, in the case of Bernier v. Pacific Mutual Life
Ins. Co.' 9' involving a specific aviation risk exclusion 8 and an in-
contestable clause which in itself listed as exceptions non-payment
of premiums and violation of the conditions of the policy relating
to military or naval service in time of war, distinguished between
the facts therein involved and those faced by the court in the
Conway decision. The latter case was interpreted by the Louisiana
court as authority for the proposition merely that a life insurance
company may, without doing violence to a provision making the
policy incontestable after a stated period, except from the so-called
coverage, or risk assumed, any cause of death that the company
sees fit to except, provided, that the exception shall be expressed so
plainly in the policy as to leave no reasonable doubt that the ex-
ception is to remain after the policy shall have become otherwise
incontestable. Listing of specific exceptions in the incontestable
clause itself, and failure to include the aviation risk exception
therein was interpreted on the basis of the inclusio unius est ex-
clusio alterius maxim' 99 as of necessity denying effect to such avia-
tion clause after the expiration of the incontestable period.
Statutes Prohibiting Settlement for Less Than Face Amount:
In construing the applicability of such statutory requisites to
various queries arising thereunder, the Texas courts which have
been by far the most prolific, have repeatedly ruled invalid policy
provisions for payment of less than the maximum value of the
policy in event of death resulting from certain causes, or occurring
within a certain time.20 0  Such view was even adopted by the
falling therefrom or therewith, or while operating or handling any such vehicle
or device, is a risk not assumed under this Policy, but in the event of death,
so occurring, the Company will pay the reserve under this Policy, and the
Policy shall thereupon be terminated .. 
197. 178 La. 1078, 139 So. 629 (1932).
198. "It is hereby understood and agreed, in the event of death of the
insured arising in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, from engaging in
aerial navigation, except while riding as a fare-paying passenger in a licensed
commercial aircraft provided by an incorporated common carrier for passenger
service, and while such aircraft is operated by a licensed transport pilot and
is flying on a regular civil airway between definitely established airports, the
only liability under the policy shall be for a sum equal to the premiums paid
thereon, and the policy shall thereupon terminate."
199. Note 179.
200. First Texas'State Ins. Co. v. Smalley, 233 S. W. 314 (Tex. Civ. App.
1921) ; Amer. Nat. Ins. Co. v. Dixon, 231 S. W. 165 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) ; Amer.
Nat. Ins. Co. v. Hawkins, 189 S. W. 330 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) ; First Texas State
Ins. Co. v. Bell. 184 S. V. 277 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).
The statute involved in these cases was Sub. 3 of Art. 4742 of the Rey. Stat.
of 1911, providing that no policy of life insurance shall be "issued or delivered In
this state, or be issued by a life insurance company incorporated under the laws
of this state, if It contains: "A provision for any mode of settlement at maturity
of less value than the amounts insured on the face of the policy, plus dividend
additions, if any, less indebtedness to the company on the policy, and less any
premium that may, by the terms of the policy be dedudted; provided, that any
AERONAUTIC RISK EXCLUSION
judiciary of this state where such provisions appeared on the face
of the policy.2
0 1
Inclusion of aeronautical exceptions and exclusions in the body
of the policy by the majority of companies without particular effort
to print it on the first page thereof, necessarily brought into prom-
inence in this'connection the decisions inconsistently determinative
of what constituted the face of the policy.20 2 Texas decisions tend
toward the strict interpretation of such word as meaning the first
part of the policy, 20 3 while more recent authority of another juris-
diction is to be found construing such term as referring to the
entire policy contract.204
Concern was likewise at one time felt as to whether double
indemnity provisions in life policies were not in themselves accident
provisions and therefore subject to not uncommon statutes pro-
hibiting the inclusion of exceptions as to the coverage of accident
policies otherwise than on the face of the contract. Such doubt,
has, however, been removed by comparatively recent decisions re-
jecting the classification of double indemnity provisions in life
policies as accident insurance.20 5
A distinction has apparently been drawn by the courts between
contracts providing on the occurrence of some specified' risk for
return of a specified sum less than the total value of such policy,
company may issue a policy promising a benefit less than the full benefit In case
of the death of the insured by his own hand or while following stated hazardous
occupations." For analogous statutes in other states see note 176.
201. First Texas State Ins. Co. v. Smalley, et al., 111 Tex. Rep. 68, 228
S. W. 550 (1921).
202. First Texas Prudential Ins. Co. v. Smallwood, 242 S. W. 498 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1922) ; Amer. Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Walker, 256 S. W. 950 (Tex. Civ. App.
1923) ; Julius V. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 299 111. 343, 132 N. E. 435, 17 A. L. Rt.
956 (1921).
203. First Texas Prud. Ins. Co. v. Smallwood, ibid; Amer. Nat. Life Ins. Co.
v. Walker, ibid.
204. Julius v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., note 202: "The face of an insur-
ance policy is the entire insurance contract contained in the policy. To construe
the term to mean the first page of the policy would compel the insurance com-
panies to print the policies on a sheet of paper large enough to accommodate all
the terms and conditions on the front of the sheet. Such a requirement would
find no support in reason or in law. * * *
"The object of the statute Is to prevent the insurance company from inserting
provisions in its policy provisions for optional modes of settlement professedly
for the benefit of the insured, but which in fact, provides modes of settlement of
less value than the amount fixed in the Insurance contract which the insured or
beneficiary might have paid to him in one sum. . . . The face of the policy under
consideration is all the matter printed on the first three pages, together with the
riders attached and made a part of the policy by reference."
205. Mutual Benefit Health & Ace. Ass'n of Omaha, Neb. v. Bell, 49 Ga. App.
640. 176 S. E. 124 (1934) ; Logan v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N. Y., 146 Mo. 114,
47 S. W. 948 (1900) : Purcell V. Wash. Fidelity Nat. Ins. Co., 141 Ore. 98, 16
P. (2d) 639 (1932); Fishel v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 151 Misc. 153, 270
N. Y. S. 734 (1933).; Provident Life & Ace. Ins. Co. v. R mmer, 157 Tenn. 597,
12 S. W. (2d) 365 (1928). See also Ch. 74, Minn. Laws 1935 to the effect that the
standard accident and health policy provision was inapplicable to disability or
accidental death provisions supplemental to life or annuity contracts; and revers-
ing the rule adopted in this state as a result of the prior decision of Joyce v. New
York Life Insurance Company, 250 N. W. 674, 255 N. W. 927, adopting the con-
trary view. See also the following pertinent statutes: Laws Cal. (1935), c. 145,§10271; Ind. Stat. (Burns' Supp. 1935) §39-4306 (k) (2); Comp. Stat. N. J.(1910, amend. c, 97, L. 1935) §99, p. 2871; Penn. Stat. (Supp. 1928, amend. Act
359, L. 1935) §12490 (b)-629 (b) ; W. Va. Acts (1935) c. 56, §20 (b).
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW
and those providing for the return of premiums paid or the reserve,
as affected by the statutes prohibiting inclusion of provisions in a
policy for settlement at less than the face amount thereof. Illus-
trative of this distinction is an Ohio decision 206 construing a specific
suicide clause as a "risk not assumed," and interpreting the return
of premiums therein promised by the insurer in event insured met
death in this manner, to be mere generosity on the part of the in-
surer, not affected in any way by such statute as mentioned' above.
Opinions of State Insurance Commissioners:
In order to definitely ascertain the opinions of the state in-
surance commisioners, in the light of statutory incontestable
clauses and statutes prohibiting settlement for less than face amount
of contract, as to the issuance of policies in their respective states,
with aviation exclusion riders similar to that approved by the New
York court in the Conway case, the American Life Convention0 7
submitted, immediately subsequent to the promulgation of that opin-
ion in 1930, the following rider to the commissioners of the forty-
eight states and the District of Columbia:
"Death as a result of service, travel or flight in any species of aircraft,
except as a fare-paying passenger, is a risk not assumed under this policy; but,
if the insured shall die as a result, directly or indirectly, of such service, travel
or flight, the company will pay to the beneficiary the reserve on this policy."
Three queries concerning the rider were propounded to the
commissioners:
(1) Will your department object to the use of a rider, or provision, in
language similar to the above, when presented to your department for
approval?
(2) If the response to query one is answered in the affirmative, may
total and permanent disability provisions specifically except a loss from such
hazard?
(3) May double indemnity provisions contain a like exception?
Though the replies to query one failed to approach any marked
degree of unanimity, there was nevertheless a rather surprising
degree of uniformity in the answers. Thirty-five of the replies ex-
pressed unqualified approval of the use of the riders; 0 8 four ap-
206. Western & So. Life Ins. Co. v. Horne, 100 Ohio St. 478, 137 N. E. 416
(1919).
207. Executive Offices, 230 N. Michigan Avenue, Chicago, Illinois.
208. Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Dist.
of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Hamp-
shire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio. Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia.
Wisconsin and Wyoming.
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proved with qualifications ;209 eight disapproved ;210 one refused to
comment ;211 while one refused to permit the aviation exception in
a rider, but approved of such exclusion in a policy provision. 212
Queries two and three were unanimously answered in the affirm-
ative.
Since the date of these opinions, however, the aviation ex-
clusion rider has been approved by the State of Oregon, 213 and the
States of Washington and Louisiana have each been forced to
reverse the stands taken by their respective commissioners because
of judicial decisions .2 1  At the present time, it may be generally
asserted that aviation exclusions in life policies will meet with ap-
proval in thirty-two states and the District of Columbia, while the
validity of such exclusions remains doubtful in the remaining six-
teen states.
215
1 V. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF AERONAUTICAL EXCEPTIONS.
In General:
Though recognized for more than two decades as an insurance
risk,216 aviation has never generally been excluded from coverage
by specific provision within the policy itself, but instead has either
been fully covered or else excepted by riders attached to such
policy.2 1 7  Full coverage, however, has been granted only after
209. California (insured must understand and accept provision) ; Indiana
(applicant must sign a written consent to such modification, and policy must
show on title page that it contains provisions modifying coverage for aviation
death) ; Missouri (will approve provided modifications are made for refund to
beneficiary of premiums paid on policy, Instead of payment of reserve) ; Utah(did not pass directly on queries presented-merely quoted opinion of Attorney
General to effect that aviation rider was valid if death occurred within ten
years from date of issuance of policy).
210. Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota,
Texas and Washington.
211. Oregon.
212. Nebraska: "Department has no objection to the inclusion of a policy
provision, excluding the aviation risk, but a rider to the same effect will not be
approved. Disability and double indemnity provisions may contain like ex-
ceptions."
213. Approved March 27, 1934, as a result of opinion to Insurance Com-
missioner Averill by Attorney General Van Winkle.
214. Bernier (Leidenger) v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., note 197; Pacific
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Fishback as Ins. Com., note 195.
215. Tennessee, Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Okla-
homa, Louisiana, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, Pennsyl-
vania, Wyoming and Illinois. (The Insurance Code proposed before the last
session of the Illinois legislature contained a provision (Art. 1, Sec. 229 (3))
specifically excepting from the statutory incontestable clause, non-payment of
premiums, violation of conditions of the policy relating to naval or military
service in time of war, and violation of an express condition, if any, relating to
aviation. Provision Is further made that in the latter case, the liability of the
company may be limited to a definitely determinable reduced amount, which
shall not be less than the full reserve of the policy and any dividend additions.)
216. Supra p. 306.
217. J. E. Hoskins, "Aviation and Life Insurance," National Aeronautical
Magazine," April, 1936, p. 18, at p. 36: "There is one point in which the treat-
ment of applicants with aviation hazard does differ from general life insurance
practice, namely, the use of the so-called Aviation Exclusion Rider. Policies
are sometimes issued which reduce the death benefit if death occurs as a result
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specific inquiry into the aeronautical activities of a prospective in-
sured in the form of application queries, supplemented by inde-
pendent company investigations.218 Complete rejection of applicants
exposed to aviation risks resulted in those jurisdictions which,
either because of -a statutory incontestable clause 19 or prohibitions
against settlement for less than the face amount22 0 provisions, denied
efficacy to riders or policy provisions excluding such risks.
Almost without exception, however, in common with certain
other extraordinary risks, aviation has been specifically excluded
from disability and accidental death provisions, the result being
that these clauses afford by far the most fertile field for study of
the development and evolution of aviation risk exceptions. 2 1 Even
in the comparatively rare situations where such exceptions were in-
cluded within the body of the policy, language identical with that
of these disability and accidental death exclusions has been gen-
erally employed. 222
Disability and Double Indemnity Provisions:
Complete lack of uniformity in the expression of aeronautical
risk exception on the part of the various insurance companies 223 has,
of necessity, involved in this study a detailed examination of the
policies of each separate company. However, the evident imprac-
ticability of the presentation of such a study here makes it man-
datory to limit this discussion to the evolution of the exceptions
used over the past two decades by ten well-known and representa-
tive insurance companies.2 24
of aviation. Sometimes flying as a passenger on scheduled lines is permitted
and, in other cases, any flying as a fare-paying passenger. This type of ex-
clusion is almost unique in life insurance. The only other hazard which is ever
excluded for more than the first two years of a policy is war service. (The
vast majority of policies are written without either of these restrictions.) The
reasons why life insurance companies write policies which exclude the hazard
of death while engaged as a pilot, and not policies which exclude coverage
while engaged as a yard switchman, are: (1) purchasers of large amounts of
insurance are more liable to be engaged in flying than in any other hazardous
pursuit; (2) men now in business or professional positions are more liable to
take up aviation than they are to turn to some other hazardous occupation:
(3) the difference in risk between the best and worst pilots is unusually great."
(Italics are the author's.)
218. See pages 6 and 7.
219. Note 174.
220. Note 176.
221. The 1935 Handy Guide to Standard and Special Contracts, and
Premium Rates, Non-Forfeiture Values, Dividends, Net Costs and Annuities.
The Spectator, 1913 to 1935, inclusive.
222. Ibid.
223. The 1935 Handy Guide (note 221) lists 173 companies doing business
in the United States and Canada.
224. Connecticut General Life Insurance Company, Hartford, Connecticut;
Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company, Hartford, Connecticut; Conti-
nental Assurance Company, Chicago, Illinois; Equitable Life Assurance Society
of the United States, New York, New York; Lincoln National Life Insurance
Company, Fort Wayne, Indiana; Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Com-
pany, Springfield, Massachusetts; Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York,
New York. New York; Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company, Philadelphia,
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While participating in or in consequence of having participated
in aeronautics, and engaged in aeronautics2 5 appear to have been
rather consistently used prior to the landmark Bew v. Travelers
Insurance Co. case 226 in 1921, (though in spite of the approval of
the participate exception in this case as covering a casual passenger
in a plane), a general flurry of revamping of these exceptions in
the light of possible future developments in aviation resulted from
the innuendo of the decision suggesting engage to refer only to one
taking an active part in the operation of a plane, and participate as
having general efficacy only so long as aviation remained a non-
occupational activity.27
Developments 1921-1936-Equitable Life and Lincoln Na-
tional adopted engaging as passenger or otherwise exceptions, the
former using the exception with submarine and aeronautic ex-
peditions, 228 while the latter employed aerial flight or submarine
descent2 9 as expressive of the activity excepted from coverage.
Connecticut Mutual varied only in the use of aeronautic or sub-
marine operations,230 while Prudential failed to include the as pas-
senger or otherwise phrase and added or in military or naval ser-
vice or from state of war or insurrection.2 31 Connecticut General
was one of the first companies to abandon the use of either engage
or participate as expressive of the action to be excepted, adopting
instead in 1922 the clause contracted or sustained while in or on or
operating or handling any vehicle or mechanical device for aerial
navigation, or in falling therefrom or therewith. Penn Mutual and
Massachusetts Mutual early22 2 chose aeronautic or submarine cas-
ualty while Travelers varied from this only in the use of expedition
instead of casualty. Mutual Life of New York and Continental
Assurance Company, however, apparently accepting the Bew de-
cision as worthy authority, continued to use participation in aero-
nautics as expressive of the exclusion.
Pennsylvania; Prudential Insurance Company of America, Newark, New Jersey;
The Travelers Insurance Company, Hartford, Connecticut.
225. Prudential Insurance Company of America used "engaged in aviation
operations."
226. Bew v. Travelers Ins. Co.. note 32.
227. 1bid. at 860.
228. Equitable Life (1922): "engaging as a passenger or otherwise in
submarine or aeronautic expeditions." (See Day v. Equitable Life Assur. Sec.
of U. S., note 79, for litigation involving this exception in connection with the
death of an insured while flying as a casual passenger.)
229. Lincoln National (1924) : "engaging as passenger, or otherwise, in an
aerial flight or submarine descent."
230. Connecticut Mutual (1923): "if death resulted directly or Indirectly
from engaging as a passenger or otherwise in aeronautic or submarine opera-
tions."
231. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer. (1924): "from having been engaged in
aviation or submarine operations or In military or naval service or from a
state of war of insurrection."
232. Penn Mutual (1922) and Mass. Mutual (1928).
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The construction of the engage exception in 1927 as not cover-
ing a casual passenger, in the initial decision involving the word as
expressive of the action excepted,2 3 was in all likelihood the cause
of the immediate abandonment of such clause by the Connecticut
Mutual Insurance Company,2 34 though the subsequent approval of
as passenger or otherwise in the Gits235 :and Head2 36 cases as assur-
ing general efficacy to either a participate or engage clause, ob-
viously caused this company to again adopt the clause in 1930 with
the as passenger or otherwise addition. 237
The having been engaged in aviation or submarine operations
or in military or naval service in time of war 1927 exception of the
Prudential Insurance Company was likewise drastically revised two
years later as the likely result of the Gits decision 238 construing
operations as restricting the coverage of the exception to the actual
handling of the mechanics of the plane, and of the Peters case 239
construing the in time of war phrase in an identical exception to
extend not only to the military or naval service, but also to the
aviation or submarine operations part of the clause. In the light
of these two interpretations combined with the judicial approval of
the as passenger or otherwise addition, 240 the 1929 exception of this
company emerged having been engaged in aviation or aeronautics,
as a passenger or otherwise.
Travelers Insurance Company discontinued the use of expedi-
lions in favor of hazards in 1929,241 and even though such expres-
sion was construed in favor of the insurer in the Gibbs case 242 in
1931, the Equitable Life Assurance Society did likewise shortly
thereafter. In company with Prudential Insurance Company and
Connecticut Mutual Insurance Company, Equitable dropped engage
as expressive of the action excepted from coverage, subsequent to
233. Benefit Association Ry. Employees v. Hayden, note 53.
234. Connecticut Mutual (1927) : Changed to "while in or on, or operating
or handling any vehicle or mechanical device for aerial navigation, or in falling
therefrom or therewith."
235. Gits v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., note 66.
236. Head v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., note 34.
237. Connecticut Mutual (1930): "engaging as a passenger or otherwise
in aeronautic or submarine operations."
238. Gits v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., note 66.
239. Peters v. Prudentiai Life Ins. Co., note 55.
240. Head v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., note 34; Gits v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co.,
note 66.
241. Travelers Insurance Co. (1929) : "provided death does not result from
any hazard of aviation except as hereinafter provided. It is further agreed that
the additional indemnity hereby provided will be paid if the death shall result
from Injuries caused by any of the hazards of aviation while the insured is
riding as a passenger in a licensed passenger aircraft piloted by an Incorporated
passenger carrier and while operated by a licensed pilot on 4 regular passenger
route between definitely established airports, but shall not be payable If the
death of the insured shall result from injuries sustained In any military or
naval aircraft or in any form of aviation travel or hazard not herein specified,
nor from death resulting from injuries sustained by the insured while acting as
a pilot, navigator or mechanic of an aircraft."
242. Gibbs v. Equitoble Life Assur. Soc., note 72.
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the construction of such word in the 1930 Charette case 243 as being
ambiguous when applied to passenger death, and adopted the ex-
ception riding as passenger or otherwise in an airplane or in any
other type of aircraft. Prudential Insurance Company adopted
generally the same clause,244 while Connecticut Mutual chose aero-
nautic flight or submarine descent.
The development of the aviation exclusion clause in the Con-
necticut General policies presents perhaps the most diligent attempts
to word the exception in the light of judicial decisions, as success-
fully to cope with every situation arising in connection with aviation
risks. Though abandoning the usual engage and participate excep-
tions shortly after the early Bew case 24 5 in favor of a very tech-
nical and specific exception, 24 s such exception was even further
changed in 1929 to or loss from being in or on, or about, or operat-
ing or handling any vehicle or mechanical device for aerial naviga-
tion or in falling or being thrown therefrom or therewith. The
about addition was undoubtedly the result of the 1927 Pittman
case2 4 7 involving for the first time the death of a passenger from
contact with the revolving propeller after completing the flight,
while the being thrown addition suggests the 1927 Wendorff case 248
involving the death of an insured' as the result of being thrown
from a seaplane by the impact of high waves during a forced
landing. Unaffected by the numerous engage and participate judi-
cial interpretations, the exception at the present time is in effect
unchanged from that of 1929, though worded in more concise
phraseology.234
Alongside of the tendency to adopt stricter language in order
to adhere to court decisions, is to be noticed a more liberal develop-
ment resulting from the general recognition of the comparative
safety of modern commercial airlines. 25 0  This liberalization is
243. Charette v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., note 94.
244. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of Amer. (1931) : "from operating or riding
in, any kind of submarine or aircraft whether as a passenger or otherwise."
245. Bew v. Travelers Ins. Co., note 32.
246. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. (1922): "contracted or sustained
while in or on or operating or handling any vehicle or mechanical device for
aerial navigation, or in falling therefrom or therewith."
247. Pittman v. Lamar Life Ins. Co., notes 104 and 105.
248. Wendorff v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., notes 104 and 111. The
policy involved in this case contained the following aviation proviso: "The
insurance hereunder shall not cover injuries fatal or nonfatal sustained by the
insured while In or on any vehicle or mechanical device for aerial navigation
or in falling therefrom or therewith or while operating or handling any such
vehicle or device."
249. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. (1935) : "Being or having been in,
on or about, operating or handling or falling with or from any vehicle or
mechanical device for aerial navigation."
250. J. E. Hoskins, "Aviation.and Life Insurance," note 217 at 569: "Over
the last five years the passenger death rate in scheduled flying has been .000042
per trip, or 4.2 per 100,000 passengers carried. Expressed in another way, the
odds are more than 20,000 to 1 against the traveler being killed on a trip by
air transport and several thousand to 1 that the traveler will reach his destina-
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clearly, evidenced in the ever-increasing tendency on the part of
insurers to cover, even in disability and accidental death pro-
visions, the risks incident to flight in the planes operated by these
lines. Equitable Life Assurance Society, Prudential Life Insurance
Company and Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York poli-
cies, at the present time, are practically identical in excepting from
the aeronautical exclusion of their accidental death benefit clause
anyone riding as a fare paying passenger in a licensed passenger
aircraft provided by an incorporated passenger carrier and oper-
ated by a licensed pilot on a regular scheduled flight over a regu-
larly established air-route between definitely established airports.51
Travelers Insurance Company's present accident death provision
varies from the above only in the language employed in expressing
the coverage granted.2 52
Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company grants the same
liberalized coverage in its modern disability provisions, 25 3 while
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company and Continental
Assurance Company go even further and extend coverage in dis-
ability provisions 'not only in flight over definitely established pas-
senger outes, but also to any fare-paying passenger on a licensed
aircraft operated by a licensed pilot.2 54
tion in as good condition as when he started (since non-fatal injuries are also
comparatively few). Since the average trip in this period has been nearly
three hours long. the death rate on the basis of hours has been .000016 or 1.6
per 100,000 passenger hours. To put it still another way, in a group of policy
holders who each travel 100 hours a year by air transport under average con-
ditions, the death claim cost to the life insurance company will be $1.60 a year
from each $1000 of Insurance. This is practically all extra cost caused by the
aviation hazard because the normal chance that a business or professidnal man
will meet accidental death in the course of 100 hours costs an insurance com-
pany only about $.01 for each $1000 insured. For a number of reasons too
technical to discuss here, the actual cost to the company will somewhat exceed
the theoretical $1.60."
- 251. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the U. S. (1935) : "resulting from
or caused directly or indirectly by riding in an airplane or in any other type
of aircraft except as a fare-paying passenger in a licensed passenger aircraft
provided by an incorporated passenger carrier and operated by a properly
licensed pilot on a regular passenger route between definitely established air-
ports."
Prudential Life Ins. Co. of America (1935): "while operating or riding in
any kind of submarine or aircraft except as a fare-paying passenger in a
licensed aircraft provided by an incorporated passenger carrier and operated
by a licensed pilot on a regularly scheduled flight over a regularly established
air-route between definitely established airports."
Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. (1935): "from operating or riding in any
kind of aircraft, whether as a passenger or otherwise, except as a fare-paying
passenger in a licensed passenger aircraft provided by an incorporated pas-
senger carrier and operated by a licensed pilot on a regular passenger route
between definitely established airports."
252. Travelers Ins. Co. (1935), note 241.
253. Connecticut Mutual Ins. Co. (1935 disability): "resulting directly or
indirectly from service, travel or flight in any species of aircraft, except as a
farepaying passenger in a licensed passenger aircraft piloted by a licensed
passenger pilot on a regular passenger route between definitely established
airports."
254. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1935 disability): "participating
as a passenger or otherwise in aviation or aeronautics, except as a fare-paying
passenger in or on any type of licensed aircraft operated by a licensed pilot."
Continental Life Assurance Company (1935 disability): "while participat-
ing or in consequence of having participated in aviation or aeronautics, except
as a fare-paying passenger on a licensed aircraft operated by a licensed pilot."
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Aviation Riders:
General Iiistory-The generally supposed efficacy of the
statutory incontestable clause in voiding, after the expiration of
the particular time period therein provided, all risk exceptions not
specifically listed within the terms of the clause itself, 5 combined
with the statutory prohibitions against- any provisions for settle-
ment in a sum less than the face amount of the policy, 25 led in-
surers for many years to rely almost entirely on careful selection
of risks in the issuance of policies. General acceptance of the
belief that immediately on the expiration of such contestable period
the inclusio unius est exclusio alterius doctrine 257 prevented further
exception from the policy coverage, is apparent in the early aero-
nautical riders.5 " Wide variance, however, ranging from return
of premiums by the insurer to forfeiture of premiums by the in-
sured, is to be found in the provisions as to the settlement under
the policy in case of the death of the insured in the manner speci-
fied in the aeronautics exclusion. 259  This discrepancy in the amount
returnable under these riders can apparently be attributed only to
variances in company actuarial policies, when such discrepancy is
considered in the light of the recognized rule that in the absence of
stipulation to the contrary, where the risk has once attached, the
whole premium is deemed to be earned and no portion thereof is
returnable, even though the risk may terminate before the expira-
tion of the term contracted. 260  Where, however, such termination
255. See supra pages 561 to 566, inclusive.
256. See note 203.
257. Note 179.
258. Representative of such riders are those issued in 1919 by Travelers
Insurance Co. and Connecticut General Life Ins. Co.:
Travelers: "In consideration of the Issuance of this contract, it is ex-
pressly agreed that if the death or permanent total disability of the insured
shall result within one year from the effective date of the contract from injuries
sustained while the insured is acting as a pilot or passenger in an aircraft, the
obligation of the company shall be fully discharged by the return without in-
tercst of the premiums theretofore paid on the contract." (Italics are the
author's.)
Connecticut General: "If at any time within two years from the date of
issue of this policy, the death of the insured shall be caused by, or result
directly or indirectly, wholly or in part, from his being in a submersible boat
of any description in any capacity whatsoever while submersed, or from en-
gaging in or undertaking aero flights, or riding in any kind of airship, balloon
or flying machine, it Is understood that said policy shall be null and void, and
all premiums paid thereon shall be forfeited to the company. (Italics are the
author's.)
259. Ibid. See italicized sections.
260. Lowell et al. v. St. Louis Mutual Life Ins, Co., et al., 111 U. S. 264, 4
S. Ct. 390, 28 L. Ed. 423 (1884) : Joshua Handy Machine Works v. American
Steam Boiler Ins. Co., 86 Cal. 248, 24 Pac. 1018, 21 Am. St. Rep. 33 (1890)
Continental Life Insurance Co. V. Houser, 111 Ind. 266, 12 N. E. 479 (1887)
Crouch v. Southern Surety Co., 131 Tenn. 260, 174 S. W. 1116, L. R. A. 1915D,
966, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 112 (1915). See also New York Life Ins. Co. v. Statham
et al., 93 U. S. 24, 23 L. Ed. 789 (1876) ; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McCor-
mick, 19 Ind. 49, 49 N. E. 44, 65 Am. St. Rep. 392 (1898) : Mutual Reserve Fund
Life Association v. Ferrenback, 144 F. 342 at 346 (1906) ; Mailhoit v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co.. 87 Me. 374, 32 A. 989. 47 Am. St. Rep. 336 (1895) : Ebert
v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association, 81 Minn. 116, 83 N. W. 506, affirmed
on reargument, 84 N. W. 457 (1900) ; Provident Savings Life Assurance Society'
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is at the instance of the insurer, or such return is required by
statute, a different rule is obviously applicable.2 61
Consistent with the constant variations in the language em-
ployed in expressing the aeronautical exceptions from accidental
death and disability provisions, were the variations in the aviation
riders subsequent to the numerous judicial interpretations of the
more commonly used exceptions. The general practice of limiting
the scope of such riders to the time period of the incontestable
clause continued, however, until the 1930 decision of the New
York court in the now famous Conway v. Metropolitan Life In-
surance Company case 26 2 distinguishing between an exclusion from
coverage and a condition, and holding an aviation rider, unlimited
in its scope as to time, to be valid and not inconsistent with the
statutory two year incontestable clause.26 Almost verbatim adop-
tion of the rider approved in the Conway case immediately fol-
lowed, though numerous companies varied it to the extent of in-




Present Status-A comprehensive survey of aviation exclu-
sions used at the present time by one hundred and seventy-one
companies throughout the United States and Canada, reveals that
121 of this -number exclude aviation risks either by rider, policy
provisions, or stamp, while 8 refuse to accept the applicant sub-
jected to aviation hazards under any condition, and 42 are very
careful as to the acceptance of such risk, but give full coverage in
the policy issued if the applicant is granted insurance.
26 n
Riders appear to be by far the most commonly used form of
aviation exclusion,26e as the tabulations-eveal that 93 of the 121 com-
of N. Y., et al, v. Ellinger, 164 S..W. 1027 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913). Vance, In-
surance. note 10, at 318.
261. Cal. Civil Code, §2617, as quoted in Vance, Insurance, note 10, at 320
is illustrative of such statutes: "Where the insurance is made for a definite
period of time and the Insured surrenders his policy, he is entitled to a return
of such proportion of the premium as corresponds with the unexpired time
after deducting from the whole premium any claim for loss or damage under
the policy which had previously accrued."
262, Note 190.
263. Note 191.
264. See Appendix "B",
265. See Appendix "A",
266. J. E. Hoskins. "Aviation and Life Insurance," op. cit. supra note 217,
at 569: "Companies which have only one scale of premiums, therefore, use
this exclusion rider in order to give partial coverage to applicants whom their
agents meet in the ordinary course of business and who turn out to be inter-
ested in aviation. Other companies use it in cases where the hazard is too
great to be covered by any reasonable extra premium or where there are unex-
pected difficulties in assessing the proper rate or where the applicant thinks the
rate quoted is excessive and reauests a restricted policy at standard rate.
Some companies feel that the applicant should have the right to choose between
full coverage and restricted coverage, and will issue the exclusion rider freely
on request. Other companies take the attitude that the interests of the bene-
ficiary should be protected against the bad judgment of the policy holder.
These latter companies confine the use of the rider to applicants who have
discontinued flying but where the permanence of the change is in doubt. Under
AERONAUTIC RISK EXCLUSION
panies employing either riders, policy provisions or stamps, use
this mode of exdlusion, while 24 use policy provisions, 3 use stamps,
and 1 employs both riders and policy provisions. As the sum to be
returned to the beneficiary in case of the death of the insured within
the terms of these aviation exclusions, 87 companies provide for
the return of the reserve, 26 for the premiums paid, 26 7 3 use both,
varying according to the individual risk, and 5 of the policy forms
examined failed to specifically state the sum to be returned.
Though variations are to be found in the exclusions of some
companies, 268 three general types of exclusions are issued by in-
surance companies at the present time:
(1) Death as a result of service, travel or flight in any species of air-
craft, except as a fare-paying passenger, is a risk not assumed under this
policy during the two years following the date of issue; but if within that
period the insured shall die as a result, directly or indirectly, of such service,
travel or flight, the company will pay to the beneficiary the reserve on this
policy.
(2) Death as a result, directly or indirectly, of service, travel or flight
in any species of aircraft, except as a fare-paying passenger on a licensed
aircraft piloted, by a licensed passenger pilot on a scheduled passenger air
service regularly offered between specified airports, is a risk not assumed
under the policy; but, if the insured shall die as a result, directly or in-
directly, of such travel or flight, the company will pay to the beneficiary the
reserve on this policy, less any indebtedness thereon.
(3) Death as a result, directly or indirectly, of service, travel or flight
in or on any species of aircraft is a risk not assumed under this policy; but,
if the insured shall die as a result, directly or indirectly of such service, travel
or flight, the company will pay to the beneficiary the reserve on this policy.
As illustrated in the more detailed tabulation of the investiga-
tion, contained in Appendix "A" to this discussion,269 provision
(2) granting coverage to air line passengers, is used exclusively by
49 companies; provision (3), excluding coverage of every kind, is
used exclusively by 32, while 36 more employ both, varying accord-
ing to the particular circumstances of the risk involved. Only 3
companies still use (1) exclusively while a single company employs
both (1) and (3).
V. 1936 SPECIFIC AVIATION RISK COVERAGE.
The close of the year 1935 saw conclusive indications of wide-
spread recognition on the part of insurers of the rapidly increasing
these conditions, if the policy holder carries out his intention, there is in effect
no exclusion." (Italics are the author's.)
267. Companies vary as to whether or not these premiums are with or
without interest. However, the great majority of companies at the present time
do not Include interest.
268. See Appendix "B".
269. See p. 584.
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degree of aeronautical safety, to the extent of marked liberalization
of aviation risk coverage. 7 ° Typical of such liberalization"' is the
present aviation coverage offered by Aero Insurance Under-
writers, 27 2 Equitable Life Assurance Society, and Prudential Insur-
ance Company of America.
Characterizing the coverage as "a tribute which we are glad to
pay to the safety of American Aviation" the Aero Insurance Under-
writers offer a business policy for $50,000 for a $50 per year
premium; $10,000 of which would follow each individual whenever
flying the airlines and also when at airports and places of forced
landings.2 7 3  Granting full coverage up to a maximum of $100,000
to applicants with 21 to 50 takeoffs or 41 to 100 hours of flying a
year, and proportionately scaling the rates for coverage of applicants
with takeoffs and hours of flying of more or less degree,2' 4 the Pru-
dential Insurance Company, in formally announcing such liberalized
coverage, 2 5 !attributed the step to "continued improvement in the
safety record of air transportation." Similar announcements by
Equitable Life Assurance Society of United States in November,
1935, were to the effect that the Society would thereafter accept
with greater freedom applicants flying as fare-paying passengers
over established air-routes, attributing such policy liberalization to
270. Figures of the Bureau of Air Corpmerce of the United States Depart-
ment of Commerce show that for the two years ending June 30, 1935, only 27
passenger fatalities occurred during that period out of over a million passenger
flights. The statistics of this same Bureau, released In 1936, show that from
July to December, 1935, commercial airlines flew 1,054,882 miles per accident,
and 17,973,688 passenger miles per passenger fatality.
271. J. B. Hoskins, "Aviation and Life Insurance," op. cit. note 217 at 569:
"A few companies are absorbing this (aviation) loss ($1.60 per $1,000) and
offering standard insurance to men who use the airways in the ordinary course
of business, regardless of the amount of flying. This must be regarded as a
voluntary contribution toward the advancement of business progress, and a
company which does not choose to make such a contribution, and instead be-
lieves that each class of policyholder should pay its own cost, cannot fairly
be criticized."
272. Aero Insurance Undrwriters (not a life company) issue policies on
aviation hazards for the Eagle Indemnity Co., Globe Indemnity Company,
Phoenix Indemnity Company, Great American Indemnity Company, Royal In-
demnity Company, and London Guarantee and Accident Company.
273. The policy covers all named employees and additional employees are
added automatically from the time their names are mailed or telegraphed to
the Underwriters. (Coverage announced Dec. 19, 1935.)
274. The formal Prudential Life Ins. Co. statement follows (in part)
"Applicants with not more than 20 take-offs nor more than 40 hours of flying a
year will be accepted at regular rates with a maximum limit of $200,000 of old
and new insurance combined. Applicants with 21 to 50 take-offs or 41 to 100
hours of flying a year will also be accepted at regular rates, but the Acci-
dental Benefit, If applied for, will be rated. The maximum limit will be
$100,000 of old and new Insurance combined.
"Applicants with more than 50 take-offs or more than 100 hours of flying
a year, may in exceptional cases, be accepted at regular rates, but as a rule,
will be rated. The Accidental Death Benefit, if applied for, will be rated or
refused depending on the merits of the case. The maximum limit will be
$50,000 for old and new Insurance combined.
"It should be emphasized that the Accidental Death Benefit, when granted,
covers the risk of flying as a fare-paying passenger on a scheduled flight over
a regularly established line, but no other flying. An executive or employee
of an air transport company flying on a pass would not be considered as a
fare-naying passenger."
275. James F. Little, Vice-president and Actuary of the Prudential Ins.
Co. of America. Eastern Underwriter, Dec. 6, 1935, p. 40.
AERONAUTIC RISK EXCLUSION
"studies of recent developments in commercial aviation. ' '21' Stand-
ard rate are applicable to a greatly increased number of cases, with
corresponding adjustments in extra premiums due to large amounts
of flying.Y
77
General acceptance of applicants whose use of airlines does not
exceed 15 or 20 trips a year, provided such trips are made on regu-
lar airways, on scheduled trips, with licensed pilots, and for business
purposes was also recently announced by Massachusetts Mutual
Life,27 8 while in 1935 Connecticut General Life Insurance Com-
pany, in addition to the issuance of a Private Flier's Accident
Policy, 79 voluntarily extended coverage while flying as a fare-
paying passenger on regular commercial lines, to fifty-six holders
of accident and disability policies of that company.
280
VI. PREDICTED EFFICACY OF 1936 ExCLUSIONS.
General Importance:
Though this revolutionary liberalization indicates even more
widespread acceptance of aviation risks in the future and conse-
quent abandonment-of such stringent exclusion clauses, nevertheless
276. Vice-president W. W. Klingman in letter addressed to the Managerial
Staff of the Society, Nov. 21, 1935. Eastern Underwriter, ibid.
277. The formal announcement stated (in part): "Where the aviation
hazard is ratable on the basis of liberalized rules for passengers or the current
rules for other types of aviation risks, the Equitable Society will continue as
heretofore to assess an extra premium where such can be satisfactorily de-
termined and will not offer the applicant the choice of a policy without the
aviation coverage in lieu of the extra premium. This is in keeping with current
opinion against the issuance of Insurance which does not insure. In appro-
priate cases, however, the Society is now prepared to Issue a policy with a
permanent exclusion clause against death resulting from an aviation accident.
The new clause is intended only to permit the insuring of aviation risks, which
the Society has formerly been obliged to decline because of the impossibility of
determining a satisfactory extra charge or because of the hazard was too great
to insure at the higher rating. Test pilots and student pilots are among the
risks in this group. The Society announces that because of special considera-
tions, it is not in a position to use the aviation exclusion clause in the following
sixteen states: Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Minne-
sota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South
Dakota, Tennessee and Wyoming." (See note 215.)
278. This is recognized as a general rule by the company, and where in-
vestigation indicates that there is a use of private airplanes, or trips which
do not come within the rule, or where the terrain over which most of the flying
is done is extra hazardous, or where the type of business the applicant is en-
gaged In would demand constant and rapid travel, the insurance is either
leclined or an exclusion is attached, depending on what the company feels is
the extra hazard involved, and whether or not an exclusion rider would be valid
in the state where the contract is delivered.
279. Appendix "D," of original thesis not included in printing.
280. The extended coverage read: "Under the accident and disability
forms listed herewith, and subject otherwise to the conditions and provisions
In the policy, the Company will pay indemnity to the extent of the minimum
amount (single indemnity) provided in the policy, for any loss specified therein
which shall result from injuries sustained while the insured is fare paying
passenger In a passenger aircraft owned and provided by an incorporated
passenger carrier, and operated by a licensed pilot on a scheduled trip over an
established passenger route of such carrier, and between definitely established
airports, and provided such aircraft is not being used for a flight in excess of
three hundred continuous nautical miles over water. This extension shall not
apply to any other form of aviation travel, hazard or exposure. Nothing herein
contained shall render the company liable for the double, triple, or quadruple
indemnity, if any, specified In the policy."
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the constant necessity of expressing with exactness the specific ex-
tent bf risk excluded and coverage granted281 suffices to evidence
the present necessity of phrasing such clause so as to clearly convey
the unequivocal intent of the insurer to the insured, the beneficiary,
and the court.
Ten Representative Companies:
Connecticut General Life Insurance Company-The influ-
ence of judicial authority is evident in the phraseology of currently
used exception clauses; though, as illustrated in those employed by
the ten representative companies involved in this discussion,28 2 the
efficacy of such exceptions in extending to all aviation risks, is, to
say the least, very doubtful. The being or having been in, on or
about, operating or handling or falling with or from any vehicle or
mechanical device for aerial navigation clause of Connecticut Gen-
eral Life Insurance Company283 is by far the most technical and
all-inclusive exception of the group; though Massachusetts Mutual
Life Insurance Company, Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company,
and Travelers Insurance Company, the former two employing avia-
tion casualty,284 and the latter aviation hazard, attempt the same
degree of coverage by means of all-inclusive words rather than
technical expression.
Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company, Massachusetts Mu-
tual Life Insurance Company, Travelers Insurance Company-
A complete absence of litigation involving either aviation hazard or
aeronautic casualty makes any conclusion as to the general efficacy
of such language, in the light of judicial interpretation of analogous
aeronautical exclusions, mere conjecture, though the present ex-
istence of thousands of policies28 and the continued issuance of
281. Joseph B. McLean, Life Insurance (3rd Ed. 1932) p. 329: "While
death from accident may seem a well-defined contingency, experience has shown
the companies that, If they wish to avoid liability under the clause for many
claims never intended to be covered and not believed to be covered, they must
be very explicit in defining exactly what is meant by accidental death and In
stating what, if any, restriction or limitations are imposed."
282. Note 224.
283. Adopted 1935. (Changed from 1932 exceptions: "while In or on any
vehicle or mechanical device for aerial navigation, or In falling or otherwise
descending therefrom or therewith, or while operating, or handling any such
vehicle or device.")
284. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co.: "The double Indemnity benefit shall not
be payable if death of the insured resulted directly or indirectly from . . .
aeronautic or submarine casualty."
Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co.: "The benefits under this provision
shall not be payable if the death of the insured resulted directly or indirectly
. . . from aeronautic or submarine casualty."
285. See petition for certiorari to United States Supreme Court, Gregory
V, Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York. Cert. denied, 56 S. Ct. 157, 80 L. Ed.
126 (1935).
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policies involving the specific exceptions by this trio of insurers28
warrant their consideration.
Defined as a "risk, danger or peril"' 8 7 and judicially construed
as "meaning and covering a risk or peril assumed or involved,"28'
it would seem that hazard might truly be an all-inclusive choice,
though the strict literal interpretations placed on analogous excep-
tions,289 suggest a note of uncertainty :as to this use of the word.
Casualty likewise has been defined as "accident; that which comes
by chance or without design, or without being foreseen,"290 and
legally construed as "inevitable accident, unforeseen circumstances
not to be guarded against by human agency and in which man takes
no part,' 29 1 suggesting that the classifications of death in an aero-
nautical crash as a casualty might possibly be averted by proof of
negligence or, in rare cases, intent on the part of the pilot. How-
ever, the refutation of such negligence or intent contention, and
the establishment of the efficacy of such exception in all deaths
resulting from actual flight, will in all likelihood result from the
general recognition of such word as being synonymous with acci-
dent, and thus bringing the clause within the ambit of consistent
judicial construction of accident, as "not to be taken too literally,
because a person may suffer injury accidental to him, under cir-
cumstances which include the design of another. 2 92 Death of the
insured as the result of being struck by spinning propellers, or
other moving parts of the machine, either before or after the flight,
due to his own inadvertence, is clearly, under the import of the
above authorities, covered by the exception.
Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, Mu-
tual Life of New York, Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance
Company, and ,Prudential Life Insurance Company of America-
The resulting from or caused directly or indirectly by riding in an
airplane or in other type of aircraft exception of Equitable Life
Assurance Society292 would, in all probability, protect the company
in the great majority of aviation fatalities, though under the pre-
286. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co. 1922-1936: Massachusetts Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 1928-1936; Travelers Insurance Co., 1929-1936.
287. Webster's New International Dictionary.
288. State ex rel. Amerland v. Hagan, Commissioner of Agriculture and
Labor, et al., 44 N. D. 306. 175 N. W. 372 at 277 (1919) : "In ordinary ac-
ceptance or comprehension, a 'hazard,' whether applied to contract relation, per-
sonal relation or to golf or gambling, means and covers a risk or peril, assumed
or involved."
289. Supra pages 309 to 311, inclusive.
290. Webster's imperial Dictionary.
291. Bouvier's Law Dictionary; Words and Phrases, 3rd Series.
292. Spreacher v. Ensminger, 167 Iowa 118, 149 N. W. 97 at 99 (1914)
Klopfenstein v. Union Traction Co., 112 Kan. 770, 212 P. 1097 at 1098 (1923)
Gilliland et al. v. Ash Grove and Portland Cement Co., 104 Kan. 773, 180 P.
793 at 794 (1919).
293. Note 251.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW
cedent of strict construction of aeronautical clauses, 29 4 the efficacy
of the clause in all likelihood would not be extended to include
death of an insured as the result of aviation hazards while not in
actual flight. Particularly would this be true if the fatal accident
occurred prior to the actual take-off. 95 For the same reasons, the
operating or riding in any kind of aircraft exclusion of Mutual Life
of New York,296 the aeronautic flight of Connecticut Mutual Life
Insurance Company,29 7 and the operating or riding in any kind of
submarine or aircraft exclusion of Prudential Life Insurance Com-
pany of America,9 s would be effective as to all aviation risks with
the likely exception of those while insured is not actually in flight-
either immediately prior to the takeoff or subsequent to landing.
Lincoln National Life Insurance Company, and Continental
Life Assurance Company-The inclusion of the as passenger
or otherwise phrase in the participate exclusion of Continental As-
surance Company, 29 and the engage exception of Lincoln National
Life Insurance Company 0 apparently assures the judicial efficacy
of such exceptions insofar as the point has been directly determined
by the courts.2 01  However, the unequivocal rejection of as pas-
senger or otherwise as making an aeronautic expeditions exception
all-inclusive, 30 2 combined with judicial renunciation of participate 3,
and engage °4 as including casual passengers, would, to say the least,
seem to demand the classification of these exclusions as being
unsatisfactory.
VII. CONCLUSION.
Though the absolute unpredictability of judicial interpretation
of any aviation exception clause is manifestly concluded by widely
divergent precedent, the following is offered as affording, insofar as
294. Note 21.
295. See Tierney V. Occidenta Life Ins. Co., notes 104 and 106 ; Blonski v.
Banker's Life Ins. Co., notes 104 and 107; Murphy v. Union Indemnity Co.,
note 108.
296. Note 251.
297. Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1936): "The company shall not be
liable for any payment hereunder if such death shall directly or indirectly
result from an aeronautic flight or submarine descent."
298. Note 251.
299. Continental Assurance Co. (1936): "participating In aeronautics in
any form as a passenger or otherwise."
300. Lincoln National Life Ins. Co. (1936): "engaging as a passenger,
or otherwise, in an aerial flight or submarine descent."
301. Head v. New York Life Ins. Co.. note 34: Goldsmith v. New York
Life Ins. Co., note 72; Mayer v. New York Life Ins. Co., note 72.
302. Provident Trust Company of Philadelphia v. Equitable Life Assur.
Sec. of U. S., note 79; Day v. Equitable Life Assur. Sec. of U. S., note 79.
303. Gregory v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y., note 35; Missouri State
Life Ins. Co. v. Martin. note 66.
304. Benefit Ass'n. of Ry. Employees V. Hayden, note 53; Masonic Acci-
dent Ins. Co. v. Jackson, notes 55 and 57; Peters v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of
America, notes 55 and 56; Flanders v. Benefit Ass'n. of Ry. Employees, note 21.
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possible to determine under the holdings and dictum of litigated
decisions, a clear and concise aeronautical exclusion:
Death resulting directly or indirectly from service or travel or
while in, on, or near, as a passenger or otherwise, any vehicle or
mechanical device for aerial flight or ascension.301
Of obvious major importance remains the status of the insurer's
future liability under any of the millions of policies containing
engage and participate exception clauses issued during the past two
decades.300  Though the apparent inconsistency marking the great
majority of past decisions involving such clauses 3 0 7 in truly creat-
ing a distinction in form which did not exist in substance, and
freely construing such exceptions without apparent regard to either
precedent or obvious intent of the contracting parties,308 demands
the classification of any attempt to predict the future judicial inter-
pretation of such exception as mere conjecture; it is nevertheless
submitted that in the absence of an as passenger or otherwise
phrase, insurers, regardless of the activity expression used, will be
held liable in all cases involving engage and participate exceptions
and arising from the death of the insured as the result of injuries
sustained while riding as a casual passenger in either a private or
commercial plane. Available authority demonstrating the absolute
ineffectiveness of an as passenger or otherwise addition when the
court so chooses to ignore it,3 09 and interpreting any construction of
passenger death in connection with engage as conclusive of am-
biguity,3 10 however, precludes the assertion of such statement, im-
pliedly recognizing the addition of such as passenger or otherwise
as making any exception, other than one involving aeronautic ex-
pedition, all-inclusive, with a degree of absolute finality.
305. Reasons for presenting this exception follow: "(A) The present
recognized efficacy of as passenger or otherwise, In connection with expressions
other than "aeronautic expeditions," is utilized; yet the clause will still be
effective in case of reversal of courts' attitude toward such phrase.(B) Service or travel Includes, pilot, crew, navigator, steward, passenger,
etc. (C) Engage and participate eliminated entirely.
(D) Mechanical device takes in airships, balloons, gliders, planes,-either
private or transport.
(E) In, on or near includes crash while in flight, as well as accidents
before and after landings (from propellers, etc.).(F) Directly or indirectly emphasizes the intent of Insurer to exclude risks
of Insured while walking to and from plane before and after flight.
(G) Service or travel, combined with the in, on or near phrase is in-
clusive clearly of forced landings.(H) If insurer desires to permit coverage of a "fare paying passenger on
a regular incorporated air line" or on a "licensed aircraft" such can be easily
added to the above exception, without in any way Impairing Its efficacy in
excluding other aeronautical risks."
306. Note 285.
307. Note 21.
308. See Bew v. Travelers Ins. Co., note 32 at 360: "I have no doubt
that the Insurance company i*ntended to provide against liability in case of
injuries to persons who navigate the air, a means of transportation still re-
garded as extremely hazardous. The question is whether it has used appro-
priate language to so provide." (Italics are the author's.)
309. Day v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S., note 79.
310. Charette v, Prudential Life Ins. Co. of Amer., notes. 91 and 94.
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Appendix "A"
Policies and/or rider forms of the following American and Canadian
life insurance companies were examined as to the provisions relating to the
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Equitable Li fe (Ia.)
Equitable Life (D. C.)
Equitable Life Assurance (N. Y.)
Eureka-Maryland Assurance
Farmers and Bankers Life









Great American Life (Kan.)

















Interstate Life & Accident
Jefferson Standard Life























Mutual Life (N. Y.)
Mutual Trust Life
National Life & Accident





New England Mutual Life
New World Life
New York Life
























Pyramid Life (N. C.)
Reliance Life
Republic Life (Tex.)
Reserve Loan Li fe
Rockford Life
St. Louis Mutual Life
Scranton Life
Seaboard Life
Security Life & Trust
Security Mutual (Neb.)




















Western & Southern Life
Western Reserve Life (Tex.)
Wisconsin Life
Wisconsin National Life
As indicated in the text of this discussion, three general types of ex-
clusions are issued by companies at the present time, though variations are
to be found in the policies of some companies. The three general types of
exclusions now in use follow:
(1) Death as a result of service, travel or flight, in any species of air-
craft, except as a fare-paying passenger, is a risk not assumed under this
policy during the two years following the date of issue; but if within that
period the insured shall die as a result, directly or indirectly, of such service,
travel or flight, the company will pay to the beneficiary the reserve on this
policy.
(2) Death as a result, directly or indirectly, of service, travel or flight
in any species of aircraft, except as a fare-paying passenger on a licensed
aircraft piloted by a licensed passenger pilot on a scheduled passenger air
service regularly offered between specified airports, is a risk not assumed
under this policy; but, if the insured shall die as a result, directly or indi-
rectly, of such travel or flight, the company will pay to the beneficiary the
reserve on this policy, less any indebtedness thereon.
(3) Death as a result, directly or indirectly, of service, travel, or flight
in or on any species of aircraft is a risk not assumed under this policy; but,
if the insured shall die as a result, directly or indirectly of such service,
travel or flight, the company will pay to the beneficiary the reserve on this
policy.
Of the companies listed above, 49 use exclusively provision No. 2,
granting coverage to airline passengers; 32 employ exclusively No. 3, ex-
cluding coverage of every kind; while 36 more employ both, varying accord-
ing to the particular circumstance of the risk involved. No. 1, varying the
coverage granted during the contestable and incontestable periods of the
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policy, is used exclusively by only three companies, while both N o. 1 and
No. 3 are employed by a single company.
As was indicated in the text of this discussion, 42 of these companies are
very careful as to the acceptance of an aeronautic hazard, but give full
coverage in the policy issued if the applicant is granted insurance; 8 refuse
to accept the applicant subject to aviation hazards under any condition; while
.121 companies use riders, policy provisions, or stamps, in limiting or exclud-
ing aviation risks. Of this number, 93 employ riders, 24 use policy provisions,
3 employ stamps, and 1 employs both riders and policy provisions. •
As the sum to be returned to the beneficiary in case of the death of the
insured within the terms of these aviation exclusions, 87 companies provide
for the return of the reserve, 26 for the premium paid, 3 use both, varying
according to the individual risk, and 5 of the policy forms examined fail to
specifically state the sum to be returned.
Appendix "B"
1936 Aviation Riders Used by the Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company, New York, N. Y.
These riders are here listed as being illustrative of the present tendencies
on the part of life insurance companies toward aeronautic risks. It is to be
pointed out, however, that from a numerical standpoint the use of such a
policy coverage restriction is negligible, the records of the Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company, for example, showing that only about one in every
thousand policies contains a rider restricting the life coverage.
A. "An extra .... premium of $ ...... for the hazards of aviation except
such as are excluded by any supplemental agreement or supplemental contract
which may be attached to this Policy is included in the premium charge for
this Policy."
B. "Death as a result of service, travel or flight in any species of air-
craft, except as a fare-paying passenger, is a risk not assumed under the
policy during the two years following the date of issue; but if within that
period the insured shall die as a result, directly or indirectly, of such service,
travel or flight, the company will pay to the beneficiary the reserve on this
policy."
. C. "Death as a result direcly or indirectly, of travel or flight in any
species of aircraft, except as a fare-paying passenger on a licensed aircraft
piloted by a licensed passenger pilot on a scheduled passenger air service
regularly offered between specified airports, is a risk not assumed under this
policy, but, if the insured shall die as a result, directly or indirectly, of such
travel or flight, the company will pay to the beneficiary the reserve on this
policy less any indebtedness thereon."
D. "Death as a result, directly or indirectly of service, travel or flight
in or on any species of aircraft is a risk not assumed under this policy; but,
if the insured shall die as a result, directly or indirectly, of such service,
travel or flight, the company will pay to the beneficiary the reserve on this
policy."
E. (Accidental Death Benefit) "... that death shall not have occurred
as a result, directly or intlirectly, of travel or flight in any species of aircraft,
except as a fare-paying passenger on a licensed aircraft piloted by a licensed
passenger pilot on a scheduled air service regularly offered between specified
airports; . .
F. (Total and Permanent Disability) "Waiver or premium shall not be
made for total and permanent disability which resulted . . . from bodily
injury sustained by the insured while participating in aviation or aeronautics
except as a fare-paying passenger on a licensed aircraft operated by a licensed
pilot or . . .
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